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Summary 
Benefits for retired employees are of particular interest to policy makers because of the growing 
number of retirees and forecasts indicating that some future retirees may not have the necessary 
financial resources to maintain their standards of living. Part of this congressional concern is what 
happens when bankrupt employers are unable to provide promised pension and health benefits to 
their retired employees. 
In chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, the employer receives protections against its financial 
commitments in the hope that it may once again become profitable. This protection could include 
not having to honor obligations concerning pensions and retiree health insurance. Its employees 
may therefore be at risk of not receiving some of their promised benefits. Unionized and non-
unionized employees may be treated differently under the law because unionized workers have a 
legal contract governing their terms and conditions of employment.  
The costs to the employers for the pension, health insurance, and other benefits promised to 
retired employees are known as legacy costs, and different costs are subject to different federal 
laws. Although employers are required to prefund their defined benefit pension trusts, the level of 
required funding may not be present as the employer enters bankruptcy. The Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a quasi-public agency, monitors the finances of pension plans. 
The PBGC becomes the trustee of and pays the benefits to participants in terminated, 
underfunded single-employer pension plans. PBGC benefits are subject to a statutory maximum 
that may be less than the retiree was promised by his or her employer. The PBGC has been 
running deficits for several years, and the deficit for one of its two programs is at an all-time 
record high. PBGC funding comes from employer premiums set by Congress, the assets of the 
plans it takes over, and investment returns. There is no taxpayer funding. 
Some retirees receive health benefits from their former employer. Retiree health benefits, 
however, are not insured by any public agency, and employers are not required to prefund health 
benefits. On the other hand, employees (perhaps represented by their unions) can fund health 
benefits (for active and retired employees) through a tax-preferred trust fund known as a 
Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA). When the employer and union agree to 
form a VEBA, and it is approved by the bankruptcy court, the employer generally contributes a 
collectively bargained level of funding to the VEBA. Providing the contribution usually fulfills 
the employer’s total responsibility for retiree health care. All subsequent retiree health benefit 
decisions are transferred to the trustees of the VEBA.  
After a discussion of these issues, this report provides three examples of bankruptcy proceedings 
where the retirees’ pensions and health insurance benefits received substantial federal attention: 
the General Motors Corporation, the Delphi Corporation, and the Patriot Coal Corporation. 
During bankruptcy proceedings for the General Motors Corporation (commonly known as Old 
GM or pre-bankruptcy GM) bankruptcy, retiree health benefits were central and pensions, 
although underfunded, were not a major issue. Old GM’s main union, the United Auto Workers 
(UAW), accepted stock in the General Motors Company (commonly known as New GM or post-
bankruptcy GM) as a partial funding source for its retiree health care VEBA. The VEBA has 
covered retiree health benefits since 2010. It was intended to cover retiree health benefits for 80 
years, but it is unclear how long its funding will last. 
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Pensions were a central source of controversy during the bankruptcy of the Delphi Corporation 
(Delphi). Some (union and nonunion) employees had been promised a pension greater than the 
PBGC maximum. When the various Delphi pension plans were terminated by the PBGC, most 
unionized employees did not see their pensions fall because of supplemental pension coverage 
originally negotiated by Old GM and the UAW. The salaried Delphi workers, however, had no 
union, and some found themselves receiving lower pension benefits than had been promised by 
Delphi. Salaried workers formed a labor association, the Delphi Salaried Retirees Association 
(DSRA), with hopes of strengthening their position. The DSRA has been unsuccessful in its 
efforts to have their members’ pensions increased, and the subsequent court case has not yet been 
settled.  
The bankruptcy of the Patriot Coal Corporation (Patriot) was also complicated and contentious, 
even though federal law covering retired coal miners has been in place for many years. Both 
pension and retiree health benefits were central to the negotiations. The relevant union, the United 
Mine Workers of America (UMWA), is a multiemployer union where the collectively bargained 
contracts cover the employees of many employers. The UMWA Pension Trust was underfunded 
before the Patriot bankruptcy, and remains underfunded. In fact, some consider the potential 
insolvency of the coal employers’ pension plan a threat to the overall solvency of PBGC’s 
program on multiemployer pension plans. Because many Patriot retirees were employees of 
another employer, Peabody Energy, when they were actively working, the bankruptcy court ruled 
that Peabody, and not Patriot, was responsible for funding the VEBA newly created to cover 
health benefits. 
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Introduction 
Benefits for retired employees are of particular interest to policy makers because of the growing 
number of retirees and forecasts indicating that some future retirees may not have the necessary 
financial resources to maintain their standards of living.1 Part of this congressional concern is 
what happens when bankrupt employers are unable to provide promised pension and health 
benefits to their retired employees. 
This report explores the protections of benefits awarded retirees and future retirees of bankrupt 
private-sector employers under current law. Although there are many types of employee benefits, 
active employees, retirees, and the employers themselves are often especially concerned with 
post-retirement pensions and health insurance benefits, usually the two largest components of 
these so-called legacy costs. This analysis provides examples from two industries of interest to 
Congress where competitive pressures resulted in changes in each sector’s business outlook: 
automobiles and coal. 
Automotive Industry. The bankruptcy of the General Motors Corporation (Old GM) 2 in 2009 was 
the fourth-largest bankruptcy in U.S. history,3 and was accompanied by a period of federal aid to 
the automotive industry. Two distinctive features of the Old GM bankruptcy were that federal 
financing was important to the ultimate outcome, and that the outcome was associated with a 
particularly strong labor union—the United Auto Workers (UAW).4 
The report also focuses on the Delphi Corporation, an automobile parts supplier5 where salaried 
retirees attempted to receive the benefits that hourly UAW retirees received.6 The benefits to 
UAW hourly employees at Delphi had been contractually promised by Old GM in the pre-
bankruptcy period. Salaried workers at Delphi had no such contractual promise. In order to 
facilitate increasing their benefits, salaried retirees formed a labor association, the Delphi Salaried 
Workers Association (DSRA).7  
Coal Industry. The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) represents over 73,000 coal 
miners.8 Congress has periodically passed legislation covering retiree benefits for coal miners 
                                                 
1 For more information, see Vickie Bajtelsmit, Anna Rappaport, and LeAndra Foster, Measures of Retirement Benefit 
Adequacy: Which, Why, for Whom, and How Much? Society of Actuaries, January 2013, 
https://www.soa.org/search.aspx?go=True&q=&page=1&pagesize=10&or=True&adv=True&with=measures+of+retire
ment+benefit+adequacy&within=0, and Alicia H. Munnell, Natalia Sergeyevna Orlova, and Anthony Webb, How 
Important is Asset Allocation to Financial Security in Retirement?, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, 
CRR WP 2012-13, April 2012, http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/wp-2012-13.pdf. 
2 Old GM is a commonly used expression for GM before its bankruptcy. Details are given in a later section of this 
report. 
3 For more information, see http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/01/news/companies/gm_bankruptcy.  
4 The full name of the UAW is the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America.  
5 Delphi was part of General Motors until 1999 when it was spun off as a separate company.  
6 It is not conventional to refer to “Old Delphi” and “New Delphi,” partly because the name of the entity (Delphi 
Corporation) was the same before and after the bankruptcy. 
7 As will be discussed in a later section of this report, associations do not have the same collective bargaining rights as 
unions. 
8 For more information, see https://www.unionfacts.com/union/United_Mine_Workers. 
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since at least the 1940s. In October 1992, passage of the Coal Act9 protected health benefits for 
some retired coal miners. In 2006, trust funds covering health insurance for retired miners 
received federal assistance.10 Various bills dealing with pensions and health benefits provided by 
bankrupt coal employers were introduced in the first session of the 113th Congress. These bills 
were influenced by the July 2013 bankruptcy of the Patriot Coal Corporation (Patriot), an 
employer with coal mines in West Virginia and Kentucky. 
These three case studies are not necessarily representative of all chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings of large, unionized firms. Indeed, as case studies, they are not necessarily 
representative of all bankruptcy proceedings of large, unionized firms in industries in which 
Congress has become involved. Nevertheless, they do provide some evidence of how the federal 
government deals with retiree benefits in industries where competitive pressures have changed. 
This report begins with a discussion of whether bankrupt firms can invalidate previous 
commitments covering retiree pensions and health insurance. The report next discusses the 
specific protections accorded to retiree pensions and health insurance benefits. Certain types of 
pensions are guaranteed by a quasi-public agency, while no such guarantee exists for retiree 
health insurance. The report concludes with brief case studies of the bankruptcies of Old GM, 
Delphi, and Patriot.11  
Protections for Retirees: Background Factors 
Whether retirees and future retirees receive their promised pensions and health insurance benefits 
depends on many factors. Four are discussed in this section: 1) the type of bankruptcy (e.g., 
chapter 7 or chapter 11) and the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code;12 2) the type of labor 
organization (e.g., union, association, or not organized); 3) the type of employee (e.g., active 
employee or retired employee); and 4) the legal relationship between the bankrupt employer, any 
subsidiaries, and any parent company. 
Bankruptcy 
Employers generally file one of two forms of bankruptcy: chapter 7 (liquidation) or chapter 11 
(reorganization). The bankruptcies filed by companies in the automotive and coal industries have 
generally been filed under chapter 11; therefore, this report will focus on chapter 11 bankruptcies 
after providing background information on both types. 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is designed for liquidation. For businesses, this generally 
involves complete cessation of the business and disposition of all assets. The employer files for 
chapter 7 bankruptcy when it believes that no amount of reorganization (including restructuring 
                                                 
9 Title XIX, Subtitle C, Health Care of Coal Miners (P.L. 102-486, 1992). 
10 Title II, Subtitle B, Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (P.L. 109-432, 2006). 
11 This report does not cover labor organizations that have never been used at Old GM, New GM, Delphi, or Patriot. 
For example, Multiple Employee Welfare Associations (MEWAs) are not discussed. 
12 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
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and financial modifications) would make the business profitable. Under chapter 7, a trustee is 
appointed to preside over the consolidation and ultimate distribution of the employer’s assets. The 
assets would either be sold or transferred to the employer’s creditors. In either case, the value of 
the assets would be used to reimburse claimholders in a prescribed manner. Those with secured 
claims would be paid first.13 Remaining assets then would be used to pay select unsecured 
claims.14 If the assets were sufficient to pay all the priority claims in full, the remaining assets 
would be used to pay the unsecured, non-priority claims on a proportional basis. Any claim for 
retiree health or pension benefits would be both unsecured and non-priority. In short, employers 
in chapter 7 bankruptcy are usually unable to fund any retiree health benefits and are only able to 
pay pension benefits if their pension trust fund has sufficient assets. 
Chapter 11 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings generally involve a plan to restructure a business so that it 
may become viable.15 In other words, a debtor (often the employer) filing under chapter 11 
generally expects its obligations to be reorganized so that the business can continue to exist.16 
Under chapter 11, the debtor generally remains in possession of the assets and continues to 
operate. The debtor here is known as the debtor in possession. The debtor in possession operates 
the business.17 In some cases, a buyer may be found for some or all of the assets. However, no 
assets may be sold outside of the normal course of business without the approval of the 
bankruptcy court.  
Retiree benefits do not automatically end when a company files under chapter 11. Two sections of 
the Bankruptcy Code govern the law determining retiree benefits before the debtor sells assets 
under chapter 11.18 Section 1113 covers the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
for unionized firms, and Section 1114 covers the payment of retiree health insurance in both 
unionized and nonunionized firms. 19 
11 U.S.C. Section 1113 – Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Section 1113 covers the conditions under which a debtor in possession may reject a CBA by 
either modifying or terminating it. Although the employees (through their union) can be expected 
                                                 
13 A secured claim is one where the claimant has the right to take and hold or sell certain property of the debtor in 
satisfaction of some or the entire claim. An unsecured claim is one where the claimant holds no special assurance of 
payment. 
14 More specifically, the remaining assets would be used to satisfy unsecured claims with priority under Section 507 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
15 When a firm has filed under chapter 11 and then determines that it will not be able to successfully reorganize, it may 
either convert the bankruptcy to chapter 7 or structure its own liquidation within chapter 11. 
16 Some chapter 11 cases, however, result in liquidation of the debtor company. Example include Circuit City, 
Whitehall Jewelers, and Linens’n’Things. For more information, see H. Jason Gold and Dylan G. Trache, Liquidation 
of Troubled Businesses: Chapter 11 Liquidations Increasing, Wiley Rein LLP, March 31, 2009, 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/11228/liquidation-troubled-businesses-chapter-11-liquidations-increasing. 
17 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). 
18 Much of this section is taken from archived CRS Report RL33138, Employment-Related Issues in Bankruptcy, by 
Robin Jeweler. 
19 A CBA is a negotiated contract governing the terms and conditions of employment. Information on the contents of a 
CBA is provided in the next section. 
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to argue that the negotiated benefits should continue to be awarded, the bankruptcy court may 
allow the debtor in possession to alter or terminate the CBA using the following procedure. The 
debtor in possession must first supply the authorized representative of the employees (usually a 
union officer) information justifying the need for modifying the employees’ benefits and 
protections. The employees (through the union negotiator) and employer then engage in good 
faith negotiations with respect to proposals for alteration or termination of the CBA. If the parties 
cannot negotiate an agreement, the debtor in possession requests that the court alter or terminate 
the CBA. The court may take this step upon finding that the following conditions have been met: 
1. The debtor in possession provided the authorized representatives of the 
employees with the necessary information, 
2. The authorized representative has refused to accept the proposal without good 
cause, and 
3. On balance, fairness favors voiding the CBA. 
This section of the Bankruptcy Code applies only to unionized workplaces because nonunion 
workplaces will not have a CBA. As will be discussed, employees who have formed an 
association are nonunion employees. 
11 U.S.C. Section 1114 – Payment of Insurance Benefits to Retired Employees 
Section 1114 covers the conditions under which the debtor in possession may terminate or modify 
retiree health benefits, whether or not the employees are operating under a CBA. Section 1114 is 
modeled after Section 1113 and requires similar findings by the court to allow the debtor in 
possession to terminate or modify retiree health insurance benefits. The debtor in possession must 
first negotiate proposed modifications in benefits with an authorized representative of the retirees. 
If they cannot agree on changes, the court may permit modification if it finds that the proposed 
modification is necessary to permit the reorganization of the employer. In addition, all creditors, 
the employer, and all other affected parties must be treated fairly and equitably, and the 
authorized representative must have refused to accept the proposal without good cause. 
Type of Labor Organization 
Whether or not an employer is in bankruptcy, the benefits promised to current retirees and future 
retirees (i.e., active employees), and the risks assumed by the current retirees and future retirees, 
may depend on the type of labor union (or association) involved. The National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA, P.L.74-198, as amended) recognizes the right of employees to engage in collective 
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. The NLRA, however, does not 
recognize a right of retirees to form a union, or to engage in collective bargaining.20 
The relationship between labor and management in bankruptcies involving collective negotiations 
depends on whether the union is a single-employer union (such as the UAW), a multiemployer 
union (such as the UMWA), or an association (such as the DSRA). A union’s membership 
generally coalesces around a type of work done by that group of employees. Union workers in 
                                                 
20 For more information on the NLRA, see CRS Report R42526, Federal Labor Relations Statutes: An Overview, by 
Gerald Mayer, Jon O. Shimabukuro, and Benjamin Collins. 
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U.S. firms are more likely to be paid by the hour than are many nonunion workers, who are often 
paid an annual salary.21 
Most unions are single-employer unions where representatives of one employer’s management 
and the union (on behalf of the employer’s employees) bargain over the terms and conditions of 
employment. These terms and conditions generally include wages, hours of work, sick days, 
vacation days, health insurance, retiree benefits, and many other aspects of work.22 The 
bargaining results in a contract, which is known as a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Any 
employee who could be a member of the union, based on his or her occupation and perhaps other 
factors, is subject to the terms of the CBA even if the employee chooses not to join the union.23 
Multiemployer unions represent employees of more than one employer in a single industry, and 
frequently negotiate the same employee benefit plan for all eligible employees of many 
employers. These plans are referred to as Taft-Hartley plans, and are relatively more likely to be 
found in industries where employees frequently move among different employers.24 CBAs with 
Taft-Hartley plans ensure that union members can keep their pensions, health insurance, and all 
other benefits as they move from one employer to the next, because the union members are 
covered by the same CBA at their various places of employment. Unions in the trucking and 
construction industries often offer Taft-Hartley benefit plans. 
Finally, some groups of active employees and/or retirees, sometimes known as associations, 
partly behave like unions, even though they are not officially certified as unions. In the current 
context, groups of retirees can form associations in order to facilitate the negotiations required by 
the Bankruptcy Code. It should be noted that the term association is not legally defined; there is 
nothing to prevent a union from calling itself an association. For example, the National Education 
Association is a union.25 In addition, some representatives of the employers call themselves an 
association such as the coal industry’s Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA). 
Type of Employee 
When bargaining over the terms and conditions of employment, either two or three categories of 
workers are typically considered. Single-employer unions may bargain on behalf of active 
employees and retired employees. (These categories are related because active employees may 
someday become retired employees.) Both active and retired employees may face the loss of at 
least some of their retiree benefits should the single employer become insolvent or otherwise be 
unable to fund the promised benefits. 
                                                 
21 For more information on the relationship between union status and salaried employment, see Daniel S. 
Hammermesh, "12 Million Salaried Workers are Missing," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 55, no. 4 (June 
22, 2002), pp. 657-658. 
22 The NLRA specifies which terms and conditions of employment must be subject to bargaining, may be subject to 
bargaining, and must not be subject to bargaining. 
23 Employees do not have to join the union or pay union dues in so-called “right to work” states. For more information, 
see CRS Report R42575, Right to Work Laws: Legislative Background and Empirical Research, by Benjamin Collins. 
24 The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-101) is commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. Although 
the majority of the Act restricted the power of unions, the Act also clarified the conditions under which unions and 
employers can use employer funds to provide pensions and other employee benefits to unionized employees. This part 
of the Taft-Hartley Act can therefore be viewed as a precursor to ERISA. 
25 For more information, see http://www.nea.org/home/18469.htm. 
The Effect of Firm Bankruptcy on Retiree Benefits  
 
Congressional Research Service 6 
Multiemployer unions, however, are also associated with a third type of employee: the orphan 
retiree. An orphan retiree is a retiree who is covered by a multiemployer CBA entitling him or her 
to benefits from an employer that is no longer solvent. However, other employer signatories to the 
contract are solvent. In other words, the multiemployer CBA may specify that an employer is 
obligated to pay for the retiree’s benefits, but the employer is unable or unwilling to do so for a 
variety of reasons; it may be entirely out-of-business, in bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise 
lacking funds, or refusing to pay the benefits. This retiree then becomes an orphan retiree. Other 
employers who are signatories to the CBA are expected to pay benefits for the orphan retirees. In 
this case, a solvent employer may find itself funding retiree benefits for individuals who were 
never employed by the company. 
Employer Agreements with its Former Subsidiaries 
Some employers entering chapter 11 bankruptcy, such as Old GM, have a long history as 
independent firms. Other employers, however, were recently part of a larger entity. For example, 
Delphi was once a division of Old GM and Patriot was once a part of Peabody Energy. The 
process by which Delphi and Patriot became independent employers is known as a spin-off, and 
Old GM and Peabody were the parent employers. The protections for retirees in bankrupt 
companies that were once a part of larger enterprises depend on the spin-off arrangements 
negotiated between the union and the parent company. In some cases, the parent company 
assumes responsibility for the pensions and/or retiree health benefits of the employees transferred 
to the new spin-off company. 
The next three sections of this report discuss protections for employee pensions, protections for 
retiree health insurance, and other health insurance protections available for retirees. 
Protections for Retirees’ Pensions: The Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
Background 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406) protects the 
interests of participants in certain employee benefit plans.26 ERISA requires that benefit plans be 
operated solely in the interest of the participants and their beneficiaries and for the exclusive 
purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. It protects employees’ 
pensions by establishing vesting requirements (how long an employee has to work to be entitled 
to benefits); funding requirements (how much the employer must set aside to pay for current and 
future benefit obligations); and pension insurance (which will pay retiree benefits in case of the 
plan sponsor’s bankruptcy). Pension obligations must be prefunded by the employer, and the 
present value of the plan’s assets must be large enough to cover the present value of the plan’s 
liabilities.27 
                                                 
26 CRS Report RL34443, Summary of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), by Patrick Purcell and 
Jennifer A. Staman. 
27 Present value is the current worth of a future sum of money or stream of cash flows given a discount rate. The higher 
(continued...) 
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ERISA pension insurance covers private-sector defined benefit (DB) pension plans. A DB plan 
typically pays a set monthly amount after the employee’s retirement. The specific amount paid is 
often based on a combination of the employee’s salary and years of service. Some DB plans, 
however, offer the benefit as a fixed lump-sum payment. Under ERISA, participants in DB plans 
do not own the pension plan assets, but have a claim on the amount of their vested benefits. 
Pension plan sponsors may not reduce workers’ vested pension benefits.28 In addition, employee 
pension trust funds are not part of the bankruptcy estate available to satisfy creditor claims. 
ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to insure the pension 
benefits of workers in private sector DB plans. The PBGC says it has “protect[ed] more than 42 
million workers and retirees in private defined benefit pension plans ...by encouraging companies 
to keep their plans, and by paying benefits when they cannot.”29 To fund its benefit obligations, 
the PBGC collects insurance premiums from employers that sponsor insured pension plans, 
receives funds from the pension plans it takes over, and earns money from investments. The 
insurance premiums are set by Congress.30 The benefits to retirees paid by the PBGC do not come 
from taxpayer funding, and the benefit obligations of the PBGC are not obligations of the United 
States.31 Pensions disbursed by the PBGC to any retiree may not exceed a statutorily guaranteed 
limit.  
The PBGC has a stated goal of avoiding the termination of plans in cases of bankrupt companies: 
Even after a company enters bankruptcy, we work to try and preserve its plans. We take an 
active role in bankruptcies to prevent unnecessary plan terminations, and to pursue claims on 
behalf of the plan participants, and the pension insurance program.32 
The PBGC maintains two separate insurance programs: one for single-employer pension plans 
and one for multiemployer pension plans. A single-employer pension plan is maintained by one 
employer for its eligible employees. A multiemployer plan is maintained under a collective 
bargaining agreement by more than one employer for all of their eligible employees. In 2013, the 
PBGC single-employer plan had a deficit of $27.4 billion, while the multiemployer plan had a 
deficit of $8.3 billion.33 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
the discount rate, the lower the present value of the future cash flows. The choice of discount rate is critical to an 
accurate valuation of future liabilities. 
28 Defined contribution (DC) plans are a second type of pension plan where the employee owns the assets as soon as 
the plan is vested. However, DC plans do not promise a set value at retirement. DC plans include profit-sharing and 
401(k) plans. 
29 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Helping Secure Retirements, Annual Report 2013, p. 4, 
https://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2013-actuarial-report.pdf. 
30 Insurance premiums are updated periodically, and depend on the risks of ongoing coverage by the PBGC. The 
American Academy of Actuaries argues that legacy costs should be incorporated into the premium-setting process. For 
more information, see American Academy of Actuaries, Examining the PBGC Premium Support Structure, Issue Brief, 
April 2012, http://actuary.org/files/publications/IB_on_PBGCPremium_120426.pdf. 
31 ERISA 4002 § 1302(g)(2) and 29 U.S.C. § 1302(g)(2). 
32 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Excellence in Customer Service, Annual Report 2012, p. 15, 
https://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2012-annual-report.pdf. 
33 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Helping Secure Retirements, Annual Report 2013, p. 26, 
https://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2013-actuarial-report.pdf. For more information, see CRS Report RS22624, The 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Single-Employer Plan Terminations, by Jennifer A. Staman and Erika K. 
Lunder. 
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Single-Employer Plans 
The PBGC protects the pension benefits of about 35 million active and retired employees in about 
23,000 single-employer pension plans.34 The PBGC categorizes single-employer pension plan 
terminations into three categories.  
• A standard termination occurs when the employer’s plan has sufficient funding 
to cover future benefits and distribute all plan benefits as insurance company 
annuities or lump sum payments.35 In this case, the PBGC’s role is solely to 
ensure compliance with the plan termination rules of ERISA.  
• A distress termination occurs when the employer’s plan does not have sufficient 
assets to pay all the promised benefits. The PBGC determines whether the 
employer meets at least one of four financial distress tests.36 In this case, the 
PBGC becomes the plan’s trustee and uses its own assets to insure that retirees 
and future retirees receive the benefits to which they are entitled, up to the 
guaranteed limit.  
• An involuntary termination occurs when the PBGC chooses to terminate a 
pension plan, even if the employer has not started termination proceedings of its 
own accord. Involuntary plan termination occurs when the PBGC believes that 
the plan owners can no longer fulfill their responsibility to pay the current and 
future retirees their pension benefits as they become due. 
The PBGC maximum guarantee for a pension plan terminated in 2014 is $4,943 per month 
($59,318 per year) for retirees who begin receiving pensions at the age of 65.37 If a participant in 
a terminated pension plan had been promised a pension greater than $4,943 a month from the 
employer, he or she would receive a reduced monthly pension from the PBGC because of the 
statutory maximum benefit.  
Multiemployer Plans 
The PBGC insures the pensions of about 10 million active and retired employees in about 1,400 
multiemployer pension plans.38 Benefit contributions for multiemployer plans are usually based 
on employer contributions in proportion to their current (covered) employment. The employer 
contributions may also be tied to some measure of employer output such as the number of items 
produced, tons of coal mined, or gross sales. Most multiemployer plans are governed by a board 
                                                 
34Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Helping Secure Retirements, Annual Report 2013, p. 4, 
https://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2013-actuarial-report.pdf. 
35 In this context, an annuity is a fixed amount of money paid periodically over time to the retiree. 
36 The four conditions are listed at Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Plan Termination Fact Sheet, p. 2, 
http://www.pbgc/gov/res/factsheets/page/termination.html. 
37 Amounts are reduced so that retirees receive actuarially neutral pension benefits if they begin receiving benefits 
before the age of 65 or in a non-standard form. One example of a non-standard form is a joint and survivor annuity, 
which must have at least two annuitants. Payments are continued as long as one of the annuitants is alive. Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, PBGC Maximum Insurance Benefit Increases for 2014, Press Release, November 6, 
2013, http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr13-13.html. 
38 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Helping Secure Retirement, Annual Report 2013, p. 4, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2013-annual-report.pdf. 
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of trustees, with equal representation from employers and employees. Contributions are held in a 
trust fund, and assets in the plan never revert back to contributing employers.  
There are various categories to describe a multiemployer plan’s funded status. A plan is in critical 
status if at least one of five conditions holds. For example, one condition is that the plan’s ratio of 
assets to liabilities is less than 65% and the value of the plan’s assets and contributions will be 
less than the value of the benefits within five years. 39 Multiemployer pension plans in critical 
status must adopt a rehabilitation plan (a range of options that will allow the plan to emerge from 
critical status during a 10-year rehabilitation period). In addition, the employers that sponsor 
plans in critical status may not increase pension benefits during the rehabilitation period.40 
A plan is in endangered status if 1) the plan is less than 80% funded or 2) the plan is underfunded 
in the current year or is projected to be underfunded in one of the next six years. A plan is in 
seriously endangered status if the plan meets both criteria for endangered status. Multiemployer 
plans in endangered status must adopt a funding improvement plan that will reduce the plan’s 
underfunding by 33% during a 10-year funding improvement period. Multiemployer plans in 
seriously endangered status must adopt a funding improvement plan that will reduce the plan’s 
underfunding by 20% during a 15-year funding improvement period. Plans in endangered status 
or seriously endangered status may not increase pension benefits during the funding improvement 
period.41 
An employer may leave a multiemployer pension plan for a variety of reasons, including when 
the employer goes out of business, negotiates a new CBA, or moves the business out of the 
pension plan coverage areas. An employer that withdraws from a pension plan may be assessed 
withdrawal liabilities.42  
Multiemployer pension plans may become insolvent when the plan is unable to pay its benefit 
obligations. Unlike single-employer plans, multiemployer plans cannot be terminated as part of 
any employer’s bankruptcy proceedings. When a multiemployer plan becomes insolvent, the 
PBGC provides a loan to the trustees of the pension plan, and the pension plan uses the loan to 
pay benefits. The PBGC never becomes the trustee of a multiemployer plan. Because many 
multiemployer pension plans face financial difficulties, the PBGC calls itself “flexible when 
plans propose new rules governing employer liability.”43 Among other innovations, the PBGC has 
attracted new employers by limiting their legacy liabilities. 
                                                 
39 For a complete description of the conditions, see Department of Labor, The Department of the Treasury, and the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Multiemployer Pension Plans: Report to Congress Required by the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006, January 2013, p. 37, http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/pbgc-report-multiemployer-pension-
plans.pdf. 
40 For more information, see CRS Report R43305, Multiemployer Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Plans: A Primer and 
Analysis of Policy Options, by John J. Topoleski, p. 7. 
41 For more information, see CRS Report R43305, Multiemployer Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Plans: A Primer and 
Analysis of Policy Options, by John J. Topoleski, p. 8. 
42 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Helping Secure Retirements, Annual Report 2013, p. 6, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2013-annual-report.pdf. 
43 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Excellence in Customer Service, Annual Report 2012, p. 8, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2012-annual-report.pdf. 
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The PBGC maximum guarantee for an insolvent multiemployer pension in 2013 is $1,073 per 
month ($12,870 per year) for those who retire with 30 years of work at age 65.44 This maximum 
benefit level from the PBGC may be less than the retiree would have received under the original 
CBA. 
The overall financial health of the PBGC multiemployer pension trust is in some doubt.45 For 
example, the multiemployer trust reported a net loss of $3.02 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2012, up 
from a net loss of $2.47 billion in FY 2011. In addition, the PBGC’s projections indicate that 
there is a 50% chance that the multiemployer insurance program will be insolvent by the end of 
FY 2022 and a 90% chance of insolvency by the end of FY 2025.46 Two multiemployer pension 
plans are thought to be a particular threat to the multiemployer trust’s overall solvency. Although 
the PBGC does not name the plans, one is in the “agriculture, mining, and construction” industry 
category.47  
Protections for Retirees’ Health Insurance: VEBAs 
ERISA does not require retiree health insurance benefits to be prefunded. In practical terms, even 
if a retiree was contractually promised $400 a month in health insurance benefits, the employer is 
not required to have $400 a month available. In addition, retiree health insurance claims are 
neither secured nor priority in bankruptcy. Therefore retirees have no guarantee that they will 
actually receive any of the benefits they were promised in a CBA. One way to guarantee at least 
some funding for health insurance benefits is for the (active and/or retired) employees to form a 
Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA). VEBAs are tax-advantaged trust funds, 
first created by the Revenue Act of 1928. VEBAs can finance many types of employee benefits, 
including retiree health insurance benefits (but not pensions).48 
VEBAs historically were owned by a single employer. More recently, however, many newly-
created VEBAs are structured as a trust independent of the employer. These trusts are sometimes 
termed independent VEBAs, new VEBAs, or stand-alone VEBAs. An independent VEBA must 
be controlled by its membership, by independent trustees, or by other fiduciaries designated by 
the membership. Trustees chosen by a CBA are considered designated by the membership. 
VEBAs have been created or modified both as part of bankruptcy proceedings and as part of the 
normal course of business in healthier entities. In all cases, the trust acts in the fiduciary interest 
of the employees. Nevertheless, the creation of a VEBA cannot be characterized as a victory for 
                                                 
44 For details on this calculation, see the worksheets at http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/multiemployer/multiemployer-
benefit-guarantees.html#2. This is the most recent year for which data are available. 
45 For more information, see CRS Report R43305, Multiemployer Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Plans: A Primer and 
Analysis of Policy Options, by John J. Topoleski. 
46 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, FY 2013 PBGC Projections Report, p. 1, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/Projections-report-2013.pdf. 
47 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Excellence in Customer Service, Annual Report 2012, p. 35, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2012-annual-report.pdf. 
48 Rules for VEBAs are found in IRC § 501(c)(9). This section covers VEBAs used for health insurance in a workplace 
with a union, association, or other group of workers sharing a common bond. The regulations concerning the tax 
deductibility of VEBA income depend on the union status of the workplace, the particular employee benefits the VEBA 
funds, and other factors. VEBAs provide tax savings when they cover health insurance in an organized workplace. 
Much of the information in this section is drawn from archived CRS Report R41387, Voluntary Employees’ 
Beneficiary Associations (VEBAs) and Retiree Health Insurance in Unionized Firms, by Carol Rapaport. 
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either the employer or the employees; each individual VEBA differs with respect to funding 
levels and other terms, and the funding levels and other terms themselves depend on the relative 
bargaining power of the employer and employees. 
Advantages Associated with VEBAs 
VEBAs, as tax-exempt instruments, provide the employer incentives to prefund health benefits.49 
More specifically, contributions to some VEBAs are tax deductible, and the investment income 
sometimes grows tax-free. In addition to these tax advantages, VEBAs can improve an 
employer’s financial position. Employers are required by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), which establishes financial and reporting standards for private-sector U.S. firms, 
to use accrual accounting when calculating liabilities for retiree health benefits; in other words, 
the employer’s liability increases as the number of employees eligible for benefits, along with the 
expected amount of these benefits, increases. This liability must be reported on the firm’s balance 
sheet, where a particularly large liability value can depress the firm’s market value. Removing the 
firm’s liability for current and future benefits by transferring the benefits to a VEBA (independent 
of the employer) can sometimes increase the market value of the employer. This increase in 
market value is a primary advantage of a VEBA for the employer. 
A primary advantage of a VEBA for the employee is a reduction in the risk associated with 
actually receiving promised retiree benefits. If the employer has already deposited funds into a 
dedicated retiree health VEBA, these funds must go to their intended recipients. They may never 
revert back to the employer. In many instances, without a VEBA, the employees have no recourse 
if an employer lacks the funds to pay for promised retiree health benefits. If an employer falls 
short, or simply decides to place its money elsewhere, no law or regulation compels the firm to 
honor past promises. 
Risks Associated with VEBAs 
The presence of a VEBA does not automatically remove all the risk to the employee, because the 
VEBA itself must have assets and income. For current and future retirees to receive promised 
benefits there must be sufficient funds in the VEBA to cover the cost of benefits. A VEBA that 
contains sufficient funds to cover the expected costs of the benefits over the life of the VEBA is 
known as a fully funded VEBA. Several scenarios can prevent VEBAs from being fully funded. 
First, the calculations of the funding needed for the VEBA to cover the expected costs of the 
retiree benefits may have been incorrect. Second, the employer may not have contributed the 
amount necessary to fully fund the VEBA. In any case, federal law does not require that VEBAs 
be fully funded.  
Funding VEBAs 
The amount of money necessary to fully fund the VEBA cannot be calculated easily.50 For 
illustrative purposes, consider a firm that wants to cover retiree health insurance for the 10,000 
                                                 
49 Archived CRS Report R41387, Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Associations (VEBAs) and Retiree Health 
Insurance in Unionized Firms, by Carol Rapaport, pp. 3-4. 
50 Ellen O'Brien, What Do the New Auto Industry VEBAs Mean for Current and Future Retirees?, AARP Public Policy 
Institute, Publication #14, March 2008. 
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employees who were actively working on December 31, 2013, plus their surviving spouses and 
dependents. The calculation of the level of funding needed to meet such a guarantee typically 
involves forecasting the following variables:51 
• the expected date of retirement for each employee working on December 31, 
2013; 
• each employee’s (and his or her covered family’s) life expectancy;  
• each employee’s (and his or her covered family’s) health care utilization over 
time; 
• the rate of medical inflation over time;  
• the return on the VEBA trust’s assets over time; and 
• changes in the tax code affecting the value of the VEBA. 
If any of these forecasts prove to be incorrect, then the amount of money needed to fully fund the 
VEBA over the course of its lifetime would be calculated incorrectly.52 
The calculation becomes more complicated if future employees (i.e., those who are not yet hired) 
are eligible for retiree health benefits funded from the VEBA. The number of such employees, 
together with the years in which they will start work and ultimately retire, must also be estimated. 
Calculating the fully funded level for an employer that has terminated the availability of benefits 
for new hires is therefore easier than calculating the fully funded level for a financially healthy 
employer that intends to continue offering retiree health benefits to new hires.  
Some VEBAs are created as part of the course of doing business, while others are created during 
chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. A VEBA may also be negotiated as part of a standard CBA, 
and then modified during bankruptcy proceedings. Financial negotiations can be contentious. A 
percentage of the amount needed to fully fund the VEBA is negotiated. As would be expected, the 
employees prefer to receive as close to 100% of the fully-funded amount as possible, while the 
employer prefers that the percentage be as small as possible. Additionally, the composition of the 
funding must be agreed upon. The employer can transfer any number of assets to the VEBA, 
including cash and notes. If the union accepts stock in the company as a VEBA funding source, 
the resulting situation becomes unusual in that a trust fund acting on behalf of the employees 
becomes a partial owner of the company. 
Protections for Retirees: Other Programs 
Apart from the PBGC, there are no federal programs that provide pension benefits to retirees 
whose former employer cannot meet its pension obligations. On the other hand, retirees may have 
a number of additional health insurance options available to them. 
Retirees who no longer have access to health insurance through their former employer(s) may be 
able to obtain coverage through Medicare, Medicaid, health insurance offered through the 
                                                 
51 Archived CRS Report R41387, Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Associations (VEBAs) and Retiree Health 
Insurance in Unionized Firms, by Carol Rapaport, p. 5. 
52 It is theoretically possible that two or more forecasting errors could offset each other. 
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exchanges established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-
148 as amended by P.L. 111-152) or, in the case of some chapter 11 bankruptcies, Title X of the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA, P.L. 99-272). Retired 
individuals who have End Stage Renal Disease as well as those who are disabled or aged 65 or 
older generally will be eligible for Medicare. Some lower-income individuals may become 
eligible for Medicaid in states that chose to expand their Medicaid program. Additionally, the 
health insurance exchanges established by ACA became active on January 1, 2014. Retirees can 
purchase health insurance policies through the exchanges; however, only those who are ineligible 
for Medicare and Medicaid will be eligible for premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies, 
provided they meet income and perhaps other requirements. 
Under COBRA, employers are required to permit employees and family members to continue 
their group health insurance coverage at their own expense, but at group rates, if they lose 
coverage because of designated work or family-related events.53 Among the “qualifying events” 
that trigger COBRA’s continuation coverage is an employer’s filing a case under the Bankruptcy 
Code. The retired employee is eligible for COBRA continuation coverage for life, and his or her 
spouse and dependents are eligible for continuation coverage for 36 months. This continuation 
coverage, however, is contingent upon the employer maintaining a health insurance plan for 
active employees. 
Two additional congressionally authorized programs have provided retiree funding in the past few 
years, but have expired. First, Section 1102 of ACA authorized $5 billion in funding for the Early 
Retiree Reinsurance Program (ERRP).54 The ERRP reimburses employers for especially high 
health insurance claims incurred by early retirees. The early retirees themselves do not receive 
any reimbursements from this program. Rather, the reimbursements are used to fund various cost-
savings and other improvements to the employer’s provision of health insurance. The ERRP 
began accepting for reimbursement claims incurred on or after June 1, 2010, and was closed to 
new enrollees as of May 6, 2011, because expenditure projections indicated that the $5 billion 
would be exhausted by the employers already enrolled. The authorization for the ERRP ended on 
January 1, 2014. 
Second, the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC), a federal income tax credit, has subsidized 
72.5% of the cost (premiums) of qualified health insurance for eligible taxpayers and their family 
members.55 Eligibility for the HCTC is limited to three groups of taxpayers, two of which are 
individuals eligible for the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. The third group consists 
of individuals whose pension plans were taken over by the PBGC. This credit expired on January 
1, 2014, and new enrollees must have registered before October 1, 2013.56 
The remainder of this report provides three examples of bankruptcy proceedings in unionized 
entities where the retirees’ pensions and health insurance benefits received substantial federal 
attention. The first example is Old General Motors and the United Auto Workers, the second 
                                                 
53 This paragraph is taken from archived CRS Report RL33138, Employment-Related Issues in Bankruptcy, by Robin 
Jeweler, pp. 8-9. 
54 The information in the paragraph is from CRS Report R43048, Overview of Private Health Insurance Provisions in 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), by Annie L. Mach, p. 21. 
55 The information in this paragraph is from archived CRS Report RL32620, Health Coverage Tax Credit, by 
Bernadette Fernandez. 
56 The information in this paragraph is from Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/The-Health-
Coverage-Tax-Credit-%28HCTC%29-Program. 
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example is Delphi and the Delphi Salaried Retirees Association, and the final example is Patriot 
and the United Mine Workers of America. 
Case Study 1: General Motors and the United Auto 
Workers 
Background 
On June 1, 2009, the General Motors Corporation filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On July 
5, 2009, the bankruptcy court approved the sale of the company's "good" assets in a "section 363 
sale."57 The sale closed on July 10, 2009.58 The buyer was a newly formed corporation that, after 
the sale was completed, changed its name to General Motors Company.59 In this report, "Old 
GM" is used to refer to General Motors Corporation, and "New GM" is used to refer to General 
Motors Company. 
Funding supplied by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was instrumental in the 
restructuring of Old GM. TARP was a part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
(EESA, P.L. 110-343).60 EESA was originally intended to purchase assets and equity from 
financial institutions, but was extended to the automobile industry by President George W. Bush 
in 2008 and further financial assistance was granted by President Barack Obama in 2009. In total, 
Old GM and New GM together received $50.2 billion in financial support from the Department 
of the Treasury.61 
Pensions 
Old GM maintained separate pension trusts for hourly and salaried workers. Unionized 
employees hired prior to October 15, 2007, are eligible for DB pensions.62 The amount of the 
pension was negotiated and depends on the number of years of service, with a supplemental 
                                                 
57 In re: General Motors Corp., "Decision On Debtors' Motion For Approval Of (1) Sale Of Assets To Vehicle 
Acquisition Holdings LLC; (2) Assumption And Assignment Of Related Executory Contracts; And (3) Entry Into 
UAW Retiree Settlement Agreement," http://www.motorsliquidationdocket.com/pdflib/2967_50026.pdf. 
58Motors Liquidation Company, Court Documents and Claims Register, General Information, 
http://www.motorsliquidationdocket.com/.  
59 Media reports at the time widely reported the event as GM emerging from bankruptcy; however, the company that 
entered bankruptcy in June remained in bankruptcy after the sale, although its name was changed to "Motors 
Liquidation Company." General Motors Company was a completely new company. See e.g., David Bailey, "GM 
Emerges from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy," Reuters, July 13, 2009, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate-
uk/2009/07/13/gm-emerges-from-chapter-11-bankruptcy/; "A Leaner GM Zooms Out of Bankruptcy," Associated 
Press, July 10, 2009, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31826205/ns/business-autos/t/leaner-gm-zooms-out-
bankruptcy/#.UzmZwoVxD3U; "A 'New' GM Emerges From Bankruptcy," National Public Radio, July 10, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106459662. 
60 Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, SIGTARP 13-003, August 15, 2013, p.1. 
61 For a full description of the GM assistance under TARP, see CRS Report R41978, The Role of TARP Assistance in 
the Restructuring of General Motors, by Bill Canis and Baird Webel. 
62 Those hired on or after this date may participate in defined contribution pension plans. 
The Effect of Firm Bankruptcy on Retiree Benefits  
 
Congressional Research Service 15 
amount for early retirees with at least 30 years of service.63 Taken together (that is, including New 
GM employees represented by any of its unions plus nonunionized employees) New GM 
pensions were underfunded by $17.1 billion at the end 2009.64 Despite this underfunding, 
pensions were not a central bargaining issue in the late 2000s. There was virtually no debate over 
UAW pensions during the bankruptcy process, and no changes were made to the pension plans.65  
Pension controversies did emerge after the bankruptcy. Concerned about possible large increases 
in their required pension contributions, New GM offered some salaried workers a buy-out in 
2012; these workers could accept a lump-sum payment in exchange for giving up all rights to any 
other kind of pension support. About 30% of 44,000 eligible, salaried workers accepted this 
offer.66 Additionally, New GM has spoken of giving the UAW workers the option of trading their 
promised DB pensions for a lump-sum payment.  
Retiree Health Insurance 
Old GM has historically provided generous health insurance coverage. In 2005, the then-
Chairman and CEO of Delphi remarked, “Some have said GM is actually a giant HMO that 
happens to make cars!”67 Over time, however, the cost of providing this insurance proved to be 
high. For example, it was reported that health care costs were the single largest component of the 
growing disparity in labor costs between the domestic and foreign automakers.68 A 2007 
memorandum of understanding covering post-retirement medical care states that UAW and Old 
GM have “discussed that the current cost of providing post-retirement medical care is one of the 
most critical issues facing the Company’s ability to compete in the North American 
marketplace.”69 
During the 2007 contract negotiations, Old GM agreed to contribute a percentage of its projected 
retiree health liabilities to an independent VEBA intended to fund retiree health benefits for 80 
years. Following their initial VEBA contributions in 2007, Old GM would also make additional 
contributions to the VEBA beginning in 2008. According to one analyst, Old GM contributions 
were projected to fund about 68% of their future retiree health obligations over the life of the 
VEBA (in present value terms).70 The 2007 contract stipulated that GM was responsible for 
funding retiree health until January 1, 2010. On that date, the VEBA (officially known as the 
UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust) took over all funding responsibilities for retiree health 
insurance from GM. Only those retirees (and their eligible spouses, surviving spouses, and 
                                                 
63 General Motors, Annual Report, 2012, p. 123. 
64 General Motors, Annual Report, 2010, p. 89.  
65 CRS analysis of contractual documents. 
66 Deepa Seetharaman, "GM spends $3.6 billion on lump-sum pension buyouts," Reuters, October 31, 2012. 
67 The Associated Press,"Remarks by Delphi Corp. Chairman and CEO Robert "Steve" Miller on Friday," The 
Associated Press State and Local Wire, October 28, 2005, http://www.wallstreet-online.de/discussion/1016181-421-
430/super-meldung-bei-delphi, BC cycle. 
68 Bill Vlasic, "Seeking the right balance; Carmakers need cuts; union fights to preserve what it has," The Detroit 
News, July 17, 2007, p. 1A. 
69 Form 8-K, Ex. 10-1, Memorandum of Understanding, Post-Retirement Medical Care, September 26, 2007, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/gmfiling20071015.pdf. 
70 Ellen O'Brien, What Do the New Auto Industry VEBAs Mean for Current and Future Retirees?, AARP Public Policy 
Institute, Insight on the Issues, March 2008, p. 7, http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/i4_veba.pdf. 
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dependents) eligible for retiree medical benefits from Old GM as of October 15, 2007, can 
participate in the VEBA.71  
The VEBA is one trust with three separate accounts, one each for New GM, Ford, and Chrysler. 
The assets in each account are separate, and one automaker’s account cannot be used to fund 
benefits for another automaker. Nevertheless, the VEBA files a single tax return. The VEBA is 
managed by an independent board of 11 trustees appointed by the UAW and the bankruptcy court 
as part of the bankruptcy settlement agreements with New GM and Chrysler.72  
Because Old GM had a large debt load and no cash flow when it entered bankruptcy, the UAW 
accepted a contribution of stock in New GM. The restructuring agreement made the UAW a 
partial owner of New GM. Such an ownership structure is not typical of bankruptcy decisions. 
When the VEBA became the source for retiree health benefits on January 1, 2010, the VEBA held 
$14.5 billion in investment assets, 17.5% of New GM’s common stock, New GM’s preferred 
stock with a face value of $6.5 billion, and a note with a face value of $2.5 billion.73 Because 
New GM’s common stock was not publically traded at that time, there was great uncertainty 
associated with the ultimate value of owning 17.5% of the common stock.74 The VEBA 
ownership in New GM fell from 17.5% in 2009 to 9.2% in 2014 as the VEBA sold stock.75 
It is difficult to evaluate the performance of a trust fund designed to last 80 years after the passage 
of only five years. Nevertheless, the VEBA officers have emphasized the investment risks when 
communicating with the membership. In particular, they have mentioned the “market meltdown” 
of 2008 and early 2009, and the uncertainty associated with projections of future medical costs.76 
In fact, the 2011 contract negotiations covered the possibility of diverting up to 10% of profit 
sharing to the VEBA.77  
The most recent legislation concerning the Old GM bankruptcy was introduced in the 111th 
Congress, and concerned the use of TARP funding in the bankruptcy proceedings. The bills were 
H.R. 4118, H.R. 6046, and S. 3526.  
                                                 
71 UAW, UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust, no date, p. 49. In addition, some Delphi retirees are eligible to 
participate. 
72 Ford never filed for bankruptcy. 
73 Letter from UAW Retiree Medical Benefit Trust to UAW GM Retiree or Surviving Spouse, May 17, 2010, 
http://www.uawtrust.org/AdminCenter/Library.Files/Media/501/Trust%20Communications/GM/GM%202010%20lette
r.pdf.  
74 When the U.S. Treasury sold a block of New GM stock through an initial public offering in fall 2010, it was priced at 
$33 per share. It later fell to a low of about $19 per share, climbed to more than $41 per share, and traded just over $33 
a share on August 5, 2014.  
75 CRS Report R41978, The Role of TARP Assistance in the Restructuring of General Motors, by Bill Canis and Baird 
Webel. 
76 Letter from UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust to UAW GM Retiree or Surviving Spouse, May 17, 2010, 
http://www.uawtrust.org/AdminCenter/Library.Files/Media/501/Trust%20Communications/GM/GM%202010%20lette
r.pdf.  
77 Kristin Dziczek, An Analysis of the 2011 UAW-Detroit Three Contracts, and a Look Ahead to 2015 Talks, Center for 
Automotive Research (CAR), Nineteenth Annual Automotive Outlook Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
June 1, 2012, http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/2012/aos/dziczek.pdf. 
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Case Study 2: Delphi and the Delphi Salaried 
Retirees Association 
Background 
The Delphi Corporation supplies parts and components directly to vehicle manufacturers. Delphi 
was originally a part of Old GM, was spun off into its own public company in 1999, and 
continues to have New GM as its primary customer.78 As part of the spin-off agreement, Old GM 
and the UAW negotiated the benefits of union employees who were being moved from Old GM 
employment to Delphi employment. Old GM agreed to cover the pension benefits for Delphi 
employees (former Old GM employees) who retired prior to October 1, 2000. The pension 
benefits of employees who retired on or after October 1, 2000, became the obligations of the 
various Delphi pension plans.79 
In addition, Old GM entered into a benefit guarantee agreement with the UAW covering 
employees whose pensions might be taken over by the PBGC in the future. In the event of a 
termination of the Delphi pension plans for hourly workers, the guarantee agreement obligated 
GM to supplement the benefits for workers who received the statutory maximum benefit from the 
PBGC. In other words, GM agreed to a “top-up” for each covered UAW retiree. A top-up is a 
payment of the difference between the benefit received from the PBGC and the benefit that would 
have been received had the plan not been terminated. Salaried employees were not UAW 
members and were not covered by this top-up guarantee. 
In October 2005, Delphi entered chapter 11 bankruptcy. Delphi emerged from bankruptcy in 
October 2009 after a group of Delphi’s lenders purchased most of Delphi’s assets; New GM also 
assumed some of the Delphi assets. 
The PBGC assumed responsibility for Delphi’s DB pension plans in July 2009. In total, the 
pension plans had almost 70,000 participants and were underfunded by about $7.2 billion, 
according to the PBGC.80  
This case study focuses on a group of Delphi salaried retirees who did not have the protections of 
a CBA. These retirees did not receive the same pension and retiree health benefits as the 
unionized retirees. On one hand, the salaried workers never had contractual rights to the benefits 
that the union workers had. On the other hand, the salaried workers argued that it was only fair 
that they receive the same benefits as their unionized coworkers. To pursue this matter, many of 
the Delphi salaried workers formed the Delphi Salaried Retirees Association (DSRA). The DSRA 
was recognized as an authorized representative of the retired employees by the bankruptcy court. 
                                                 
78 The entire world-wide entity, including all subsidiaries, is named Delphi Automotive PLC. This report covers the 
American subsidiary, which is named The Delphi Corporation; see Exhibit 21.1 of the SEC Form 10-K available at 
http://investor.delphi.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=245477&p=irol-sec.  
79 CRS Report R42076, Delphi Corporation: Pension Plans and Bankruptcy, by John J. Topoleski. 
80 A Delphi retirees group, however, has stated that its “plan was very adequately funded when it was terminated.” 
Delphi Salaried Retirees Association, "What Are We Fighting For?" press release, August 12, 2013, 
https://www.delphisalariedretirees.org/delphi/index.php/what-we-are-fighting-for. 
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Pensions 
Both Old GM and New GM might have been able to invalidate the top-up agreement with Delphi 
during the bankruptcy proceedings. Nevertheless, New GM said that it honored its top-up 
agreement with the UAW for commercial reasons.81 One reason cited was that these union 
members needed to give their consent to finalize the sale of assets in Delphi’s bankruptcy and the 
top-up would speed bankruptcy proceedings.82 In addition, New GM topped-up pensions for 
members of two other unions that comprised large shares of its workforce: the International 
Union of Electricians-Communication Workers of America (IUE-CWA); and the United Steel, 
Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers Union 
(USW). New GM maintained that it was not contractually obligated to give retired members of 
these two unions top-ups. Once the PBGC assumed responsibility for the remaining Delphi 
pensions, some Delphi salaried retirees (who were not union members) saw their pension benefits 
reduced because their monthly benefit (as previously promised by Delphi) was larger than the 
statutory maximum benefit. New GM did not top-up these salaried workers’ pensions. New GM 
argued that it had no contractual obligation to do so.83  
When the Delphi plans were terminated in 2009, the maximum benefit from the PBGC was 
$54,000 per year for an individual who retired at age 65 with no survivor benefit. As of June 
2011, the PBGC estimated that 18% of the total number of salaried retirees would see their 
pension benefits reduced to this amount, while 1% of the total number of hourly workers would 
see their total pension benefits reduced to this amount.84 
The DSRA argued that all parties, including the federal government, were treating salaried 
workers less well than hourly workers. In particular, the DSRA argued that the top-up funding 
came from TARP as part of the Old GM restructuring. 
On September 14, 2009, the DSRA filed a lawsuit against the PBGC, the U.S. Treasury 
Department, and the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry. One of the DSRA’s claims was 
that the agreement between New GM and the unions representing hourly employees to top-up the 
hourly employees’ pensions was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The DSRA argued that New GM, acting as a government 
agent because of TARP’s role in the Old GM bankruptcy, unfairly discriminated against the 
salaried employees “solely on the basis of their choice not to associate with a union.”85 The 
DSRA argued that Old GM’s bankruptcy in June 2009 voided the 1999 top-up agreements and 
that New GM renegotiated and provided the top-up to the unions’ pension plans for political 
                                                 
81 A. Nicole Clowers, Statement of A. Nicole Clowers, Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment 
Issues, Government Accountability Office, July 10, 2012, Opposite the Cover Page, 
http://gao.gov/assets/600/592225.pdf.  
82 U.S. Congress, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Government Operations, 
Statement of Steven Rattner, 113th Cong., 1st sess., September 11, 2013, p. 2. 
83 CRS is not aware of any other top-up agreements beyond those discussed in this paragraph. 
84 Delphi employed a small number of hourly workers who were members of “splinter unions;” these unionized retirees 
did not receive top-up pension benefits. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Delphi Pension Plans: GM 
Agreements with Unions Give Rise to Unique Differences in Participant Benefits, GAO-12-168, December 2011, pp. 
34-35, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-168.  
85 Black et. al. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation et. al, Second Amended Complaint, paragraph 37, 
https://www.delphisalariedretirees.org. 
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reasons. On September 9, 2011, the U.S. district court dismissed the claims against the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury. The PBGC remains a defendant in the case.  
The DSRA submitted an affidavit from a pension actuary stating that the PBGC miscalculated the 
benefit obligations of the Delphi pension plans and that the pension plan for salaried employees 
was 86.5% funded at termination.86 It also said that it was rare for pension plans with this amount 
of funding to require termination. According to PBGC estimates, at the time of termination the 
plans for the Delphi salaried employees had $2.4 billion in assets and $5.0 billion in liabilities; 
the plan was therefore only 48% funded. The PBGC indicated that it expected to be responsible 
for about $2.2 billion of the plan’s estimated $2.6 billion in underfunding. The Delphi court case 
remains ongoing; recently, a U.S. district judge ordered the U.S. Department of the Treasury to 
turn over documents related to President Barack Obama’s Auto Task Force’s role in the 
termination of the salaried pension plan.87 
There is some difference of opinion concerning Old GM’s contractual obligation to honor 
previous top-up commitments to the UAW Delphi hourly workers. Both the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) argue that the UAW was treated with special care because it 
could influence the bankruptcy proceedings and/or call a strike.88 However, the GAO writes that 
the “Treasury did not explicitly approve or disapprove of GM’s agreement to honor previously 
negotiated top-up agreements.”89 On the other hand, SIGTARP quotes a Treasury official that “it 
is my understanding that as the buyer, we got to determine which liabilities [we would take 
on].”90  
Although no top-up commitment was ever given to the Delphi salaried workers, the DSRA argues 
that the salaried workers should enjoy the same benefits as the hourly workers. This position 
rested on a notion of “fairness” without regard to contractual obligations. Nevertheless, the DSRA 
did not have current employees at New GM, and, therefore, could not slow down bankruptcy 
proceedings.  
Retiree Health Insurance 
The process of establishing health benefits for Delphi’s current and future retirees took less time 
than the still-ongoing pension process. The DSRA created a VEBA committee, and the 
bankruptcy court accepted this committee as the Section 1114 committee.91 The negotiations 
between Delphi and the Section 1114 committee proceeded according to the rules of the 
                                                 
86 This paragraph is taken from CRS Report R42076, Delphi Corporation: Pension Plans and Bankruptcy, by John J. 
Topoleski, pp. 8-9. 
87 "Judge Orders Treasury to Produce Delphi Documents in Pension Suit," The Detroit News, June 20, 2014, 
http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140620/AUTO0103/306200109. 
88 Nick Bunkley, "GM Rightly Favored Delphi UAW Pensions Over Salaried, Rattner Says," Automotive News, 
September 11, 2013. 
89 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Delphi Bankruptcy: Termination of Delphi Pension Plans, GAO-12-909T, 
July 10, 2012, Back of Title Page, http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592225.pdf.  
90 Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Treasury's Role in the Decision for GM To Provide 
Pension Payments to Delphi Employees, Troubled Asset Relief Program, August 15, 2013, Introduction, http://www. 
sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/SIGTARP_Delphi_Report.pdf. 
91 Details on a Section 1114 committee are provided in an earlier section of this report. 
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Bankruptcy Code. Delphi eventually agreed to provide $8.75 million in up front funding for the 
VEBA. The funding was in cash; the VEBA did not receive any Delphi stock. When the 
bankruptcy court accepted the agreement, only salaried workers who were retired or eligible to 
retire on or before April 1, 2009, were eligible to receive health insurance benefits from the 
VEBA. Nevertheless, the trust agreement was amended by its own trustees such that it could 
provide its benefit plans to hourly retirees of Delphi and their dependents and survivors. As a 
result, if the hourly retirees preferred the health insurance plans offered by the DSRA VEBA, they 
could enroll in these plans at their own expense instead of the plans offered by Delphi. The hourly 
retirees, however, could receive no funds from the VEBA. 
The DSRA VEBA, which is formally known as the Delphi Salaried Retirees Association Benefit 
Trust, opened with the $8.75 million Delphi contribution in 2009.92 Delphi has provided no 
additional contributions since that time. To date, the largest source of additional VEBA funding 
has been the Early Retiree Reinsurance Program. Most recently, the DSRA was advocating for an 
extension of the now-expired Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC), for which they are eligible 
because their pensions were taken over by the PBGC.93 Several bills introduced in the 113th 
Congress would extend the HCTC for varying lengths of time. These bills are H.R. 2783, S. 
1446, and S. 1859. 
Case Study 3: Patriot Coal and the United Mine 
Workers of America 
Background 
Federal involvement in retiree pensions and health insurance in the coal industry has a long 
history in the United States. Following World War II, the United Mine Workers of America 
(UMWA) demanded health and retirement benefits from coal employers. When these benefits 
were not forthcoming, the miners staged a walkout. To avoid a shutdown of American coal 
production, President Harry Truman signed an executive order seizing all of the nation’s 
bituminous coal mines.94 The Secretary of the Interior, Julius Krug, was ordered to negotiate an 
agreement with the UMWA President John L. Lewis. The Krug-Lewis Agreement, signed on May 
29, 1946, established the UMWA Health and Retirement Funds. Congress has been involved in 
the operations of coal mines ever since.95  
The current structure of pension and retiree health benefits in the coal industry is spelled out in 
the most recent National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA), a CBA between the 
UMWA (a multiemployer union) and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA), whose 
                                                 
92 The information in this paragraph is from the DSRA Benefit Trust, Quarterly Financial Report, 2012 Q4, Unaudited, 
Sources and Uses of Funds, available at http://www.dsrabenefittrust.net/dsrabene/index.php/document-center/DSRA-
Benefit-Trust-Documents/Financials/financials-2012/DSRA-BT-2012-Q4-Financial-Report-Post. 
93 For more information, see WHIO, Channel 7, March 10, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZwVoc9m2T-c?
rel=0;autoplay=1;loop=0;wmode=opaque. 
94 Bituminous is the softest form of coal. 
95 For more information on federal involvement in the coal industry, see Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion 
to Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements and to Modify Retiree Benefits Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113 and 1114, 
pp. 8-12. 
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members represent the owners of the coal mines.96 The most recent NBCWA was negotiated in 
2011 and extends through 2016. It includes, among other terms and conditions of employment, 
details covering the pension plan and three retiree health funds used by signatory employers. 
All plans contain an "evergreen clause" or "continuing contributions clause” to provide for the 
long-term financing of pensions and health benefits for retired employees and orphan retirees.97 
Thus, all employers who are (or ever were) members of the pension plan or any health plan must 
contribute, including employers who are not current members of the BCOA. In other words, 
employers who were once signatory employers to any NBCWA must continue to contribute to all 
pension and health insurance trust funds until the CBA is changed. Employers are therefore 
responsible for maintaining benefits for miners who may never have been their employees. 
Patriot filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in July 2012 and emerged from bankruptcy in 
December 2013. Patriot was formed in 2007 as a spin-off company from Peabody Energy. The 
following year, Patriot purchased Magnum Coal, itself a spin-off of Arch Coal. Consequently, 
Patriot entered bankruptcy with about three times as many retirees, inherited from Arch and 
Peabody, compared to active employees. The two parent employers had an improved financial 
picture following the spin-off; for example, the present value of Peabody’s retiree health 
obligations was reduced by $637.6 million.98 Patriot, however, was left with an estimated present 
value of over $1.6 billion in retiree health obligations, an amount the bankruptcy court called 
“astronomical.”99 In addition, Patriot had been receiving funding from the Early Retiree 
Reinsurance Program, but additional funding from this source is no longer available. 
Pensions 
The 1974 Pension Trust (the Trust) was established by collective bargaining and covers all 
employees whose employer was a signatory employer to the NBCWA one or more times. The 
Trust documents detail the required contributions of the employers and the benefits received by 
the eligible retirees under a wide variety of conditions. This Trust pre-dates the Coal Act. Patriot 
is now the Trust’s second largest contributor.  
At the time of the Patriot bankruptcy filing, the Trust was less than 73% funded and had a status 
of “seriously endangered.”100 As discussed above, the 2012 PBGC annual report acknowledges 
that were this Trust unable to meet its pension obligations, the financial position of the PBGC 
might be threatened.101 
                                                 
96 The NBCWA reflects congressional actions, including Title XIX, Subtitle C, Health Care of Coal Miners (P.L. 102-
486, enacted in 1992, and commonly referred to as the Coal Act) and Title II, Subtitle B, Coal Industry Retiree Health 
Benefit Act (P.L. 109-432, enacted in 2006, and commonly referred to as the Amendments to the Coal Act), and the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-87, SMCRA). 
97 As discussed above, an orphan retiree is a retiree who has a multiemployer CBA entitling him or her to benefits from 
an employer that is no longer solvent. 
98 Patriot Coal, Form 10-K, p. 20, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Feb. 22, 2013. 
99 Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements and to Modify Retiree 
Benefits Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113 and 1114, p. 24. 
100 As discussed above, a plan is in seriously endangered status if the plan’s funding ratio is less than 80% and the plan 
has a funding deficiency in the current year or is projected to have one in the subsequent five years. 
101 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Excellence in Customer Service, Annual Report 2012, p. 35, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2012-annual-report.pdf. 
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The Patriot bankruptcy negotiations ended with Patriot remaining a participant in the 1974 
Pension Trust. Patriot covers current retirees, surviving spouses, and dependents under the 
existing terms. In addition, active employees hired before January 1, 2012, are covered. 
Employees hired on or after January 1, 2012, will not be eligible for the 1974 (defined benefit) 
Pension Trust, but will have a (defined contribution) 401(k) retirement plan.  
Retiree Health Insurance 
As with the automotive industry, the coal industry provides generous health benefits. The UMWA 
says that it sacrifices wage increases for employees in exchange for better health insurance 
because miners face many occupational health challenges.102  
Coal employers usually maintain their own retiree health plans. However, some employees, 
especially those whose former employers are no longer mining coal or are bankrupt, have access 
to one of three UMWA retiree health care funds. Each fund has its own trustees, and the trustees 
are responsible for paying premiums and benefits and for investing the assets of their respective 
trust fund.  
• The Combined Benefit Fund (CBF) is a trust fund created by the Coal Act. It 
provides retiree health benefits for UMWA employees (and their surviving 
spouses and dependents) who retired on or before July 20, 1992, and did not have 
another source of retiree health benefits because they were orphan retirees. The 
currently-proposed legislation (discussed below) does not affect the CBF. 
• The 1992 Benefit Trust is a trust fund created by the Coal Act. It provides retiree 
health benefits to those employees (and their surviving spouses and dependents) 
who retired from the coal industry after July 20, 1992, but before September 30, 
1994, and do not have another source of retiree health benefits. The major 
difference between the 1992 Benefit Trust and the CBF is that under the 1992 
Benefit Trust, the premiums paid by each signatory coal company are adjusted 
each year to meet the expected health care costs of the beneficiaries. The 1992 
Trust is therefore better able to keep pace with increases in health care costs than 
the CBF.  
• The 1993 Benefit Trust covers employees who retired on or after October 1994. 
In addition, new, inexperienced miners hired after January 1, 2007, cannot 
receive benefits from this Trust unless they are disabled as a result of a mine 
accident. The 1993 Benefit Trust is therefore almost entirely closed to new 
enrollees.103 The 1993 Benefit Trust was created through negotiation between the 
UMWA and the BCOA as part of the NBCWA of 1993. Retired miners are 
eligible for the 1993 Benefit Plan if their past employers either went out of 
business or defaulted in providing retiree health benefits. The NBCWA specifies 
the required contributions of the BCOA members for active employees, retired 
employees, and orphan employees. Note that the bargained level of funding need 
                                                 
102 U.S. General Accounting Office, Retired Coal Miners' Health Benefit Funds: Financial Challenges Continue, 
GAO-02-243, April 2002, p. 21, http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234405.html. Compensation for employees with black 
lung disease, however, primarily comes from its own funding source and was not an issue in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
103 See Patriot Coal, Form 10-K, p. 21, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Feb. 22, 2013. 
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not correspond with the funding level required to maintain the contractual level 
of health care benefits for its members.  
At the start of the chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Patriot spoke of eliminating retiree health 
insurance benefits entirely. The UMWA’s Section 1114 committee started negotiations, but the 
bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Patriot’s Section 1113 and Section 1114 motions. Therefore 
Patriot no longer had to honor the existing NBCWA, and no longer had to honor previous 
commitments to provide retiree health insurance to UMWA retirees (or any other current or future 
retirees). The court’s ruling was viewed unfavorably by the UMWA, and the union threatened to 
strike. Patriot and the UMWA then began negotiations that included contributions to a new 
VEBA. 
These negotiations became irrelevant when the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 
8th Circuit reversed an earlier bankruptcy court decision. The original bankruptcy court would 
have allowed Peabody Energy to stop paying the health care benefits for certain retirees that it 
had agreed to at the time of the Patriot spin-off. The appellate decision requires Peabody to take 
responsibility for paying the health care benefits for these retirees. After another round of 
negotiations, the Peabody case was settled with Peabody contributing $90 million to the VEBA in 
2014, $75 million in 2015, $75 million in 2016 and $70 million in 2017, in addition to other 
requirements.104  
Recent Legislation 
Several bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress that would change the benefits 
awarded to current and future retirees in the coal industry. 
• H.R. 980 and S. 468, Coal Accountability and Retired Employee (CARE) Act of 
2013, would transfer part of the interest earned on a coal mine land reclamation 
fund to the 1974 UMWA Pension Trust to be used to pay pension benefits 
required under this plan without regard to whether Pension Trust participation is 
limited to individuals who retired in or after 1976. The Act would make those 
who would be eligible to receive benefits from the 1974 UMWA Pension Trust 
following an insolvency proceeding relating to a coal operator eligible for the 
1992 Trust.  
• H.R. 2627, The Caring for Coal Miners Act, would make retired miners who are 
not receiving benefits they are otherwise entitled to because of a bankruptcy 
commencing in 2012 eligible for the 1993 Benefit Trust. Benefits made available 
by this Act would be reduced by the amount actually paid by the VEBA on behalf 
of a covered beneficiary, so that no beneficiary receives a greater benefit than 
would have been payable before the establishment of the VEBA.  
• H.R. 2918, The Coal Healthcare and Pensions Protection Act of 2013, would 
make retired miners who are not receiving benefits they are otherwise entitled to 
because of a bankruptcy commencing in 2012 eligible for the 1993 Benefit Trust. 
                                                 
104 In re Patriot Coal Corporation et. al., Notice and Motion of the Debtors for Entry of an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 105(a), 363(b), 1113 and 1114(e) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a), Approving the Settlement With Peabody Energy 
Corporation, and the UMWA, On Behalf of Itself and in its Capacity as Authorized Representative of the UMWA 
Employees and UMWA Retirees, document 5163, http://patriotcaseinformation.com/maincase.php?start_no=4901&
end_no=5000.  
The Effect of Firm Bankruptcy on Retiree Benefits  
 
Congressional Research Service 24 
Benefits made available by this Act would be reduced by the amount actually 
paid by the VEBA on behalf of a covered beneficiary. Any additional monies 
(except the amount needed to cover administrative costs) would be transferred 
from the VEBA to the 1993 Trust. Any remaining excess monies would be 
transferred to the 1974 UMWA Pension Trust. 
All four bills introduced in the 113th Congress would increase the health benefits available to 
Patriot retirees. The CARE Act of 2013 would allow Patriot retirees to join the 1992 Benefit 
Trust, and thus receive the most generous benefits available to any orphan retiree. The Caring for 
Coal Miners Act would allow those who became orphan retirees as a result of a bankruptcy 
proceeding commencing in 2012 to join the 1993 Benefit Trust. However, the 1993 Benefit Fund 
would be prohibited from covering expenses on behalf of a beneficiary that was already covered 
by the VEBA. The Coal Healthcare and Pensions Protection Act of 2013 would allow those who 
became orphan retirees as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding commencing in 2012 to join the 
1993 Benefit Trust, and would transfer all monies from the VEBA to this Trust. Any extra funding 
after healthcare obligations have been fully met would be transferred to the 1974 UMWA Pension 
Trust. 
Of the four bills introduced in the 113th Congress, only two would definitely increase the funding 
available to the 1974 Pension Trust. The CARE Act of 2013 would move some of the interest 
earned on a coal mine land reclamation fund to the 1974 Pension Trust. This move, however, 
would reduce the funds available to two health benefit trust funds. The Coal Healthcare and 
Pensions Protection Act of 2013 would transfer any extra funding after healthcare obligations 
have been fully met to the 1974 UMWA Pension Trust. 
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